THE CIA NOW WANTS EVEN MORE POWER TO SPY ON AMERICANS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

You Need To Be Aware Of The Federal Intelligence Agencies Spying On All Of Us Without Search Warrants As Required By The Fourth Amendment To The Constitution.

These agencies say they believe that the Fourth Amendment – which protects the individual right to privacy – only regulates law enforcement and does not apply to domestic spying.

There is no basis in the constitutional text, history or judicial interpretations for such a limiting and toothless view of this constitutional guarantee. The courts have held that the Fourth Amendment restrains government – all government. Last week, the CIA asked Congress to expand its current spying in the United States.

Here is the backstory.

When the CIA was created in 1947, members of Congress who feared the establishment here of the type of domestic surveillance apparatus that the Allies had just defeated in Germany insisted that the new CIA have no role in American law enforcement and no legal ability to spy within America. The legislation creating the CIA contains those unambiguous limitations.

Nevertheless, we know that CIA agents are present in all 50 statehouses in the United States. They didn’t arrive there until after Dec. 4, 1981. That’s the date that President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, which purports to give the CIA authority to spy in America – supposedly looking for narcotics from foreign countries – but keeps from law enforcement whatever it finds.

Stated differently, while Reagan purported to authorize the CIA to defy the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution and by federal law, he insisted on a “wall” of separation between domestic spying and law enforcement.

So, if the CIA using unconstitutional spying discovered that a janitor in the Russian Embassy in Washington was really a KGB colonel who abused his wife in their suburban Maryland home, under E.O. 12333, it could continue to spy upon him in defiance of the Fourth Amendment and the CIA charter, but it could not reveal to Maryland prosecutors – who can only use evidence lawfully obtained – any evidence of his domestic violence.

All this changed 20 years later when President George W. Bush demolished Reagan’s “wall” between law enforcement and domestic spying and directed the CIA and other domestic spying agencies to share the fruits of their spying with the FBI.

Thus, thanks to Reagan and Bush, and their successors looking the other way, CIA agents have been engaging in fishing expeditions on a grand scale inside America for the past 20 years. Congress knows about this because all intelligence agencies are required by statute to report the extent of their spying secretly to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

This, of course, does not absolve the CIA of its presidentially authorized computer hacking crimes; rather, it gives Congress a false sense of security that it has a handle on what’s going on.

What’s going on is not government lawyers appearing before judges asking for surveillance warrants based upon probable cause of crime, as the Constitution requires. What’s going on is CIA agents going to Big Tech and paying for access to communications used by ordinary Americans. Some Big Tech firms told the CIA to take a hike. Others took the CIA’s cash and opened the spigots of their fiber-optic data to the voracious federal appetite.

If government lawyers went to a judge and demonstrated probable cause of crime – for example, that a janitor in the Russian Embassy was passing defense secrets to Moscow – surely the judge would have signed a surveillance warrant. But to the government, following the Constitution is too limiting.

Thus, by acquiring bulk data – fiber-optic data on hundreds of millions of Americans acquired without search warrants – the government avoids the time and trouble of demonstrating probable cause to a judge. But that time and trouble were intentionally baked into the Fourth Amendment so as to keep the government off our backs.

Not to be outdone by its principal rival, the FBI soon began doing the same thing – gathering bulk data without search warrants.

When Congress learned of this, it enacted legislation that banned the warrantless acquisition of bulk data. Apparently, Congress is naive enough to believe that the CIA, the FBI and the National Security Agency, their cousin with 60,000 domestic spies, will actually comply with federal law.

Last week, that naivete was manifested front and center when the CIA sent a letter to both congressional intelligence committees addressing its spying on foreign persons and the Americans with whom they communicate, and asking to expand that reach inside America.

The timing of the CIA’s letter coincides with a decision Congress must make in the next 10 days – whether to reenact Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, allow it to expire on April 19 or expand it as the CIA has requested. Section 702 permits warrantless spying on foreigners and the Americans whom intelligence agencies suspect communicate with them. Section 702 is an unconstitutional free pass for domestic spying.

So, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of members of Congress from both parties to limit and in some cases to prohibit the warrantless acquisition of bulk data by the CIA from Americans, the practice continues, the CIA defends it and presidents look the other way.

In 1947, Congress created the CIA monster, which today is so big and so powerful and so indifferent to the Constitution and the federal laws its agents have sworn to uphold that it can boast about its lawlessness, have no fear of defying Congress and always escape the consequences of all this largely unscathed. Even President Harry Truman, who signed the 1947 legislation into law, later acknowledged as much and condemned what the CIA had become.

You should suspect the CIA and its cousins will get away with this because they spy on Congress and possess damning personal data on members who regularly vote to increase their secret budgets.

When will we ever have a government whose officials are courageous enough to uphold the Constitution?

Don’t count on it during your lifetime unless you finally decide to be brave enough to actually support freedom rather than submit to authoritarianism as most Americans do now.

THE LATEST SPY STORY: WAS IT INVOLVING ISRAEL YET AGAIN?

It Is Widely Known Among Those Who’s Intellect Is Still Functional, That The Jewish State Is The Most Aggressive And Successful “Friendly” Nation Spying On Washington.

The strongest indicator that Israel was the planned recipient of what the Toebbe’s stole is the silence over who the beneficiary might have been.

An intriguing though fragmentary espionage story made headlines eleven days ago and then disappeared abruptly, suggesting that some folks in high places in the government and media were fearing that the full tale would prove to be embarrassing to someone. We are referring to the report of the arrest made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service of an American government employee who worked in nuclear engineering. Jonathan Toebbe and his wife Diana apparently had stolen highly sensitive information on nuclear propulsion systems and the stealth hull designs of the next generation Navy’s Virginia class attack submarine fleet and had been caught after several times seeking to sell their wares to what they thought to be a foreign power.

Two days after the arrest, the Toebbes appeared in court in Martinsburg West Virginia and were ordered to remain in jail as they were considered a flight risk. So far, so good but the interesting part of the story is that the intended purchaser was apparently not obvious adversaries like Russia and China, but rather an ostensibly friendly country, which was not identified. The Toebbes clearly thought they were offering their technology to a foreign country’s intelligence service, one presumes, but they were in fact in contact with the FBI, which allowed them to arrange dead drops in Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia and paid them to continue providing new material on small digital computer cards before closing the trap and making the arrest.

And how the FBI learned about the Toebbes is another interesting part of the story. Apparently in April 2020 the couple had mailed a package containing manuals and other material relating to the propulsion systems to a foreign country, together with an offer to establish a covert relationship in return for payment in cryptocurrency. The package somehow wound up in someone’s hands in the foreign postal system or government and eventually made its way anonymously eight months later to the FBI legal attaché at the American Embassy. It included a note that read “Please forward this letter to your military intelligence agency. I believe this information will be of great value to your nation. This is not a hoax.”

One has to suspect that the material actually had reached the foreign intelligence agency that it had been sent to where it was considered too hot to handle, so it was forwarded on to the American officials anonymously to get rid of it.

The documents involved relating to the arrest and the alleged crimes committed by the Toebbes are heavily redacted, far beyond the identity of the foreign country involved, so it is somewhat difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened. Toebbe, a former naval officer, has held senior positions in the Navy bureaucracy, up to and including serving on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, which would have given him access to beyond top secret codeworded details of next level submarine technology. It is information that is only shared with Great Britain and, in a recent policy move, with Australia, both American allies that will deploy nuclear powered submarines in the Pacific to deter China. The documents the Toebbes reportedly stole and tried to sell were produced by a little-known American government facility the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in West Mifflin Pennsylvania.

One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the question of who might have been the potential buyer of the stolen technology. Building nuclear submarines is not exactly high on the priority list of any but a small handful of countries that have global or regional pretensions that might be supported by having cruise missile nuclear weapons capable ships that can stay under water for months at a time. Germany could conceivably build such vessels but has no defensive needs that require such an expedient. So could France, presumably. Japan and South Korea are perhaps more plausible recipients, particularly as they have the industrial and scientific bases that could benefit from and use the technology if they chose to go that route, and both are threatened by China.

And, of course, there is always Israel, which frequently tends to come up when there are stories of espionage committed by a friendly country against the United States. In this case, of course, the Israelis, if targeted by the Toebbes, apparently did not seek the approach and that may be why the information sent in the package possibly to Mossad was sat on for over six months. Nevertheless, there is a definite resemblance to what the Toebbes set out to do with the Jonathan Pollard case of the 1980s. Pollard, a non-practicing Jew and Navy analyst, stole a whole roomful of top-secret defense materials. He was in it for the money and tried to sell the intelligence to several foreign governments before he “got religion” and found a buyer in Israel. He became the most damaging spy in the history of the United States. After being caught, tried, convicted and spending twenty-eight years in federal prison, he was released on parole but not allowed to travel. The Donald Trump administration did not renew the parole in 2020 and he moved to Israel, where he was met at the airport by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who presented him with his citizenship papers. He is regarded as a hero in Israel and he has a city square named after him. So, the question becomes, was history repeating itself with the Toebbes?

Against that speculation is the fact that Israel already has an established nuclear deterrent more than capable of eliminating its regional enemies if needs be. It has no use for an expensive submarine with abilities that are not required in the goldfish bowl of the Middle East, unless of course if the United States were to gift Jerusalem with such a new military bauble. It would also have no need to get involved in something that might ultimately have tremendous blowback if exposed, potentially severely damaging the relationship with Washington.

One rational theory is that Israel was indeed the target of the Toebbes’ scheme. It is widely known that the Jewish state is the most aggressive and successful “friendly” nation spying on Washington and it is backed up by a host of wealthy and powerful co-religionists who work hard to both “help” it and cover-up for its crimes. One should suspect that if Israeli intelligence were interested in collecting on the submarine technology they would eschew potential screwballs like the Toebbes and instead work their other sources in Washington to collect the information independently, accounting for the time lag between the mailing of the package and the forwarding of it to the FBI. When Pollard was active, his Israeli Embassy handler would sometimes ask him for specific files by number, indicating they had other high level agents at work, and it must be assumed that that is still the case. Far too many in Congress and the Pentagon are very happy to have a lunch with that nice young man or woman from the Israeli Embassy and maybe share a secret or two.

But, that speculation aside, perhaps the strongest indicator that Israel was the planned recipient of what the Toebbe’s stole is the silence over who the target might have been. When the media and the federal government are silent on a foreign policy or national security issue it often means that Israel is involved, directly or indirectly. Will we the American public ever learn “who was it?” Probably not. Just one more secret about the Zionist state who controls most of those in Washington.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CYBER SPYING VS. A CYBER ATTACK

The ‘Solar Winds’ Breach Is Nothing But Espionage, Not Sabotage. America Must Be Careful How It Responds Because It Does The Same Thing All Of The Time – Even To You.

One of the very first challenges for the Biden administration in foreign and security policy will be how to respond to the massive “SolarWinds” hack of U.S. government systems, possibly carried out by the Russian intelligence services.

President-elect Joe Biden has said that the incident will be “an overwhelming focus for my administration.”

This is a relatively uncharted region of interstate relations, for which it is vitally important to draw up ground rules. Unfortunately, the response to the hack by American officials, politicians, and the media has already done much to blur the facts of the case and make a sensible response more difficult.

The most important thing to remember in this regard is the difference between an “attack” and an act of espionage. The SolarWinds hack has been generally described in the United States as the former (including by incoming national security adviser Jake Sullivan, and Biden), but was in fact the latter. Nobody is suggesting that the hackers in this case introduced viruses to paralyze American state systems or damage domestic infrastructure and services. This was purely an information-gathering exercise.

This distinction is crucial. An attack on the citizens or infrastructure of another state has traditionally been considered an act of war. Actions by the United States, Russia, Israel and other countries in recent decades have somewhat blurred this distinction. But no one can doubt that if another country carried out a major act of sabotage on American soil, (especially one threatening the lives of citizens), then Washington’s response would — rightly — be a ferocious one. As a matter of fact, while Russia has engaged in limited operations against Estonia and Ukraine, the only countries that have to date carried out a truly successful and destructive act of cyber-sabotage are the United States and Israel, through the “Stuxnet” virus, which as introduced into the Iranian nuclear system and first uncovered in 2010.

Espionage by contrast is something that all states do all the time — often to friends as well as adversaries. We may remember the scandal under the Obama administration when American intelligence was found to have hacked into the communications of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other senior leaders of NATO countries. The hacking of a Belgian telecom company by British intelligence (“Operation Socialist”) is another example. And we would be really surprised to learn that American intelligence is not trying to penetrate the state information systems of Russia and China.

And for each revealed act of espionage there is a well-established and calibrated set of responses. The aggrieved country issues a formal protest and expels a given number of “diplomats” from the country responsible. That country expels an equal number of diplomats. The media and the writers of spy thriller writers have a party. Then everything goes back to normal. For after all, everybody knows that there is no chance whatsoever that states will ever give up spying.

There are, however, three aspects of cyber-espionage that make it different from and more dangerous than traditional espionage.

Firstly, as Jake Sullivan has pointed out, unlike most forms of espionage, hacking can be used both for spying and for sabotage, and one can form the basis for the other. A key goal of responsible statecraft should be to establish a clear line between the two when it comes to cyberspace: to develop a set of calibrated and limited responses to cyber-espionage, and to make clear that cyber-sabotage will lead to a much fiercer and more damaging retaliation.

Secondly, unlike traditional espionage, the cyber variety is an area where third parties, uncontrolled by either side, can play a major role and cause serious damage to relations (and of course this also gives all sides plausible deniability — as with American moves against Iran).

For example, those behind the authors of the 2011 cyber attack on the G20 summit in Paris have never been identified. Several major hacks have been conducted by independent cyber anarchists, or even by clever teenagers, sometimes it seems simply for fun. In the present atmosphere, however, all such hacks against the United States are likely to be blamed on Russia and to lead to a further deterioration of relations.

Thirdly, and in part because of these blurred lines, no clear and understood international traditions are in place concerning the response to cyber espionage, and there is a serious risk of overreaction leading to a spiraling escalation of tension and retaliation.

This is what the Biden administration must avoid. Apart from the immediate damage to relations, overreaction would mean that when — as is bound to happen some day — Russia or China eventually discover a cyber espionage operation against them by American intelligence, they will not only look justified in a disproportionate and escalated response — they will actually be justified.

One thing that Biden must definitely not do is to follow the suggestion that the United States should shut Russia out of the SWIFT international bank transfer system which— the most damaging of all American sanctions against Iran, and one that would have a disastrous effect on Russian trade.

Last year, then Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia would regard such a move as equivalent to an act of war and would respond accordingly. Various Russian responses would be possible, including a definitive move into the Chinese geopolitical camp and massive military aid to Iran. Without doubt however, one of them would be to move from cyber espionage to cyber sabotage against the United States.

The most sensible response would in fact be to follow literally President-elect Biden’s statement that his administration will “respond in kind” to the attack is the most sensible.— that is to say in the cyber-field. The first step (as after any counter-intelligence failure) must obviously be to strengthen American cyber-defenses which. Among other things, this requires using presidential orders to combine, streamline, and rationalize the competing plethora of American agencies currently responsible for cyber security.

The second entirely appropriate response is for Washington should also to intensify its own existing cyber intelligence operations against Russia. That, however, is another reason not to engage in overblown moral outrage over the latest hack. The American pot already has quite a global reputation for calling kettles black, and there is no need to blacken it further.

Finally, the Biden administration should do everything possible to develop agreed international restraints on state cyber operations, including an absolute ban on cyber sabotage. This should involve opening new negotiations with Moscow on longstanding Russian proposals for an international “arms control” treaty in the area of cyber warfare, and for a joint U.S.-Russian working group to establish mutual ground rules and confidence building measures.

These Russian proposals cannot be accepted as they stand (above all because of Moscow’s desire to limit free flows of information.) However, more than a decade ago, then- National Security Agency Director Keith Alexander said that “I do think that we have to establish the rules, and I think what Russia has put forward is, perhaps, the starting point for international debate.” This remains true today, and the danger of a failure to reach international agreement has grown vastly since then.

One of the worst things about hysterical statements in the United States about “cyber attacks” is that unwary readers might mistakenly conclude that things can’t get any worse. They can get much, much worse.